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This is a book on the problematics of com­
parison between huma~ beings and other animals. 
To effect this comparison, Midgley argues that 
philosophy must gain access to certain develop­
ments in contemporary science, notably eth­
ology. There are risks attl3ndant in construct­
ing this road between philosophy and a natural 
science. Hidgley would avoid the threat, 
posed by I·Jilson in Sociobiology: The Ne~ 
Synthesis, that a neurobiology eventuaIry 
could bypass, by itself replacing, moral 
philosophy. More generally, she eschews the 
more obvious pitfalls of scientism and 
physicalism by finding a middle road between 
them and an existentialist thought, (to which 
she attributes, somewhat facilely and inaccu­
rately, a concept of absolutized freedom). 
One potential gain in this project is a more 
informed philosophy that would desist fro~ 
dividing the hUl'an being within itself and 
from other nonh~~an beings. It would no 
longer fall prey to the over-simplifications 
of certain myths and metaphors about nonhuman 
animals: the animal automaton over against 
the person as soul or rationality housed in 
a body; or the "beast in man", nan's bru­
tality founded in his remnant animality. 
Since the route must cut through an ex­
ceedingly dense conceptu,l thicket, Midgley, 
understandably, can only )ffer a preliminary 
clearin~ and direction for it. Positing that 
the spe~ies human animal has a "nature", she 
gives considerable weight in its description 
to a concept of motive. By this she refers 
to a complex, evolved, genetically given 
"pattern of living", a structure consisting 
of general "active and social tendencies", 
and, on an individual or lived level, of 
certain "aims." i,fith this kind of definition 
of a human species, she can indicate (1) 
how rationality, language, and culture, the 
traditional cleavers, are, rather, continuous 
with, being outgrowths of, the peculiar but 
general human way of living; how, for example, 
rationality is grounded in a sociality shared 
with other animals; and (2) how, then, the 
relation of humans to other animals, the 
latter consisting in variant structures of 
motives, is one of kinship and complex 
species-distinct affinities. There is con­
tinuity among species, making rich, produc­
tive, and non-dichotomous comparisons possi­
ble because our nature, in common with theirs, 
is a "certain range of powers and tendencies." 
The otherness of the other is not radical. 
Even a distinction between higher and lower 
beings, the metaphor of height applied to 
evolution, Midgley finds unintelligible in 
that adaptation is relative and contingent. 
Largely implicitly, the book lays a foun­
dation for such considerations as the ethical 
status of nonhumans. If ethics is the pri­
oritizing of competing claims through reflec­
tion, human claims must derive from what is 
important to us. This necessarily issues 
from the structure of our motives. But 
these motives, in turn, point to "our kin­
ship with the rest of the biosphere." That 
kinship is not only historical, as animals 
are part of the context of our world; it is 
structural--our being is continuous with 
that of other animals. Like us, the indi­
vidual nonhuman animal is an end in itself, 
Midgley here extending Kant; like us, he is 
both an object and a subject; he is a per­
son, in that he maintains particular signif­
icant relations; he has purposes, priorities 
and claims that issue from his own inte­
grated pattern of motives. 
I~ile these last critical assertions about 
animals follow from the analysis of motive, 
in this work there is not room to fully argue 
and unpa~ them. Hu lever, Midgley does pro­
vide a consistent, c!~arly developed, and 
well-grounded justification for the require­
ment that we take nonhuman animals into 
account. We must do so not only to under­
stand ourselves, but, the work suggests, 
to solve our own conflicts of interests. 
Her analysis gives a fuller meaning to 
the sense in which human ethics necessarily 
include the interspecific. That other 
animals also have claims is part of our 
ethical dilemma. 
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